Quote (Skinned @ Feb 8 2016 07:27am)
I prefer naturalist myself :) Less metaphysical assumptions than materialistic monism...and I'm not a monist anyway, I'm a non-substance dualist al la Sartre, aka the idea that the mind and the body are radically different things.
The funniest people in philosophy are the pure materialistic monist, who tell me I don't have a mind. Or a pure idealist, who tells me I don't have a body. Not so many of the idealist anymore.
So you aren't a property dualist either? You go in the other direction? I think that might still be considered substance dualism but I'm not sure.
I think I've explained before, but I'm a panpsychist, or maybe more accurately, "physicalistic idealist". I think that physics exhaustively describes the entirety of the world, but I think the nature of the world is fundamentally mental.
I'd suggest checking out the paper "Why physicalism entails panpsychism" by Galen Strawson. It kind of explains the position or at least a similar position.
The issue with materialism is they assume the nature of the world is non mental, but there's no reason to think it should be because we know of no other "thing" it could be. I.e. what is the world actually made of? What does physics actually describe? Materialists don't have an answer except that it's definitely not mental!
My view offers a way to retain physicalism, while completely solving the mind-body problem. All that remains is the combination problem for panpsychism.
So basically I'm a physicalist, but I have a completely different ontology of traditional physicalism. So I'm a monist in the idealist sense, but still a physicalist, just one that has completely renounced materialist ontology.This post was edited by Voyaging on Feb 8 2016 03:12pm