Trump’s plan is not going to work for one reason - NATO. Whether it’s postponed by 20 or 120 years, it’s just a non-starter for the Kremlin.

This is the residue from the lingering self-deception in the West about Putin’s motives - a self-deception that was engineered by those benefitting from the conflict.

The Kremlin made it abundantly clear what its endgame is - the rest is the insofar unsuccessful attempts to shift its position. These desperate attempts are resulting in Ukraine losing swathes of territory and thousands of lives after each of the squandered opportunities to end the war on much better terms than it can feasibly hope for at every subsequent stage.

During Valday meeting, Putin was unequivocal - Ukraine’s neutrality is non-negotiable. But he dodged the question about the line of separation (formulated by Lukyanov as Ukraine’s “new borders”).

So land is up for bargaining, except Russia is clearly intent on ousting the Ukrainians from Kursk region to keep it out of the bargain.

The Kremlin reiterated yesterday that potential talks with Trump will be based on Moscow’s June 14 ultimatum which frames Russia’s starting negotiating position as Istanbul framework plus Ukraine’s withdrawal from the four formally annexed regions.

But as we know from Istanbul experience, concessions are likely. There is room for bargaining about territory. The Kremlin will try to grab one of Europe’s largest lithium deposits near Velyka Novosilka and the coking mine in Pokrovsk on which Kryvbas metallurgy depends. These are both very close to the frontline. But beyond that, it could just as well stop and agree to ceasefire.

Kremlin’s main goals in this conflict - in my reading - are to ensure Ukraine’s permanent neutrality and humiliate the West - but not too much so that a reset was possible. The rest is tactical. But it is important to understand that it wants an agreement set in stone, not a new Minsk that will be ditched after a few years.

Apart from the land, what’s really negotiable is Russia’s frozen assets. Putin knows it will be hard to get them back. But allocating them for post-war reconstruction will be good for Russia’s image and his own, for winning hearts and minds in Ukraine which is will be strongly anti-Western after what most people will see as a defeat in a war that could have been avoided. It will also allow Russia to negotiate the lifting of sanctions while taking the burden of reconstruction of the Western taxpayers’ shoulders.

As per Istanbul framework, Russia will insist on a small-sized Ukrainian army - but the exact size and armaments are also up for a bargain.

It will also press with denazification and ditching discriminative laws aimed against Russian language and common heritage. Ukraine could and should use these issues as a bargaining chip, but ultimately proceeding with both will be for its own good if it strives to be a democratic and truly European country.