Assessment by a pro-Ukrainian account
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As Russian forces continue their advance in the Pokrovsk front, long-standing systemic issues within the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to aid Russians with that. Based on numerous conversations with sergeants, as well as junior, and senior officers in command positions in the Donbas region, I am writing this post the goal of highlighting the most common and consistent problems mentioned by people on the ground, per their request. Unfortunately, the higher command remains largely unresponsive to these concerns when raised internally.
1. Disconnect in Command and Combat Readiness
There is an apparent disconnect between higher command assessment and the actual combat readiness of units. In many cases, units with limited operational capacity are tasked with responsibilities far beyond their capabilities. For example, newly formed brigades with little battlefield experience are assigned to defend critical and high-risk areas of the frontline, where Russian forces have massed sufficient strength for a potential breakthrough. At the same time, more experienced and better-equipped brigades are stationed in less dangerous sectors.
This imbalance has allowed Russian forces to pinpoint weak spots along the frontline and exploit them, especially during unit rotations - something that they can track easily due to their ISR capabilities. The Ukrainian command, in turn, often scrambles to reallocate battalions from other areas to stabilize vulnerable areas that appeared from miscalculations.
While such actions can help to stabilize the line and even prevent a breakthrough, it leaves other parts of the frontline exposed, perpetuating a cycle of vulnerability.
For context, what may appear to higher-ups as “a company with 60% of its personnel ready for deployment” may, in reality, be a fatigued unit with multiple soldiers in their 40s and 50s or people with previous injuries and chronic health problems, as well as newly arrived recruits with minimal training. The true combat readiness may be closer to 30-40%, but on paper, commanders see a combat-ready unit
2. The Lack of Truth and Realistic Reporting
The previously discussed disconnect raises the question: Why don’t officers report their unit’s inability to perform certain missions? The answer is simple: Brigade commanders and senior officers are ultimately responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of their units per regulations. Admitting that a unit cannot perform a task is often seen as a failure of brigade leadership. As a result, the command’s solution is simple: if a commander cannot ensure the unit’s readiness, someone else will be appointed to do so. But the situation with resources or combat readiness of unit doesn't improve - you just put a person who is going to push under-resourced and under-prepared units to complete a task they are not equipped to handle, leading to failed operations, abandoned positions, failed defenses, and unnecessary casualties - something that people can witness themselves by looking at the Deep State map.
3. Systematic Problems with Recruitment and Training
The quality and quantity of new recruits continue to fall short of expectations. Although some training centers have made improvements, overall readiness remains alarmingly insufficient. Many newly arrived soldiers are not prepared for the realities of frontline combat, forcing brigades to develop and implement their own internal training programs. The situation demands systemic reforms, including the creation of a structure that leverages the expertise of veterans or those recovering from injuries to train and mentor incoming recruits.
4. Little to no Accountability
Three years into the war, Ukraine has yet to fully implement an After Action Review (AAR) process, which hasn't been implemented except in cases where individual officers took the initiative. The tactical level is the highest level where it's used.
The blame for operational failures often falls on mid-level officers, and in some cases, even soldiers on the ground. Even in rare cases, after public scandals, when generals are removed from their posts following catastrophic failures, they are typically reassigned to other command positions rather than being held accountable, leaving little room for new, younger, and more innovative officers to rise through the ranks.
This inability to change with essentially a petrified soviet hierarchy within Ukraine’s military leadership continues to generate previously mentioned problems.
Epilogue
Ultimately, these problems are rooted in systemic failures at the top. Poor decision-making, inefficient resource allocation, inadequate recruitment and training programs, and a fundamental lack of understanding of the conditions on the ground continue to plague the AFU. These are not the failures of soldiers or officers who are risking their lives daily on the ground, and who are frequently blamed by command for failures. These are the consequences of people incapable of either admitting the problem or building a plan to address these problems.
The toll of these problems is paid by those on the frontlines, who sacrifice their lives and health to protect their families and their country.
https://x.com/tatarigami_ua/status/1836127294114480509?s=46