Sound analysis
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1. Despite all the talk of diplomacy, we are nowhere near a deal with Iran. The gap between the two sides remains enormous – very much in line with what we saw during previous Trump negotiations with Iran in both the first and second terms, all of which ultimately failed. There’s very little evidence that anything meaningful has changed. At its core, the U.S. position still looks less like a negotiating framework and more like a surrender document for Iran: no nuclear program, no ballistic missiles, no regional proxy activity. Iran’s position is equally maximalist in the opposite direction – essentially demanding a full U.S. military withdrawal from the Gulf. That’s not a starting point for diplomacy; it’s a recipe for stalemate.
2. But the much more important story right now isn’t diplomacy – it’s the thousands of U.S. troops being mobilized and moving toward the Middle East. That movement strongly suggests preparation for further escalation, with Kharg Island emerging as the most likely target. For any objective observer, the likely Iranian response to a U.S. move on Kharg is obvious: escalation, not capitulation. Tehran would almost certainly respond by expanding attacks on energy infrastructure across the Gulf rather than “crying uncle.”
3. Which is why it’s so striking – and frankly baffling – to see oil prices trending downward. Markets appear either deeply complacent or willfully ignoring the reality of what we are facing: the very real possibility of months more of this disruption to energy markets and increasingly complex knock on effects for energy production and distribution.
4. The Gulf states, for their part, are in a rough spot. They did not want this war, but now that it is underway, they are increasingly convinced it must end in a way that weakens Iran’s ability to threaten regional energy infrastructure and maritime routes. The problem is that even as they articulate that goal, there is no clear or realistic pathway to achieving it. And when this war eventually ends unsatisfactorily and with Iran still able to threaten Gulf energy infrastructure there is likely to be significant frustration and anger in the Gulf directed at the United States. That has the potential to shape the long-term trajectory of U.S.--Gulf relations.
5. Meanwhile, support for the war remains very high inside Israel. That shouldn’t be surprising. Israeli society is still profoundly shaped by the trauma of October 7, and that trauma continues to drive both public opinion and policy choices. It’s worth remembering that in the United States, it took years after 9/11 for public opinion to shift on Iraq and the Global War on Terror. Israelis are only about two and a half years removed from October 7. We are still very much in the early phase of that cycle, where security concerns and a sense of existential threat dominate decision-making.
6. I’d also watch out for Lebanon. There is a real possibility of a large-scale Israeli ground invasion into southern Lebanon. History suggests that such operations do not produce lasting strategic success, but that has not prevented them from being attempted repeatedly. Israel’s 20-year occupation of southern Lebanon in the 80s and 90s, along with multiple subsequent wars, underscores the limits of military solutions in that arena. And yet, under current conditions, this Israeli government is driving towards another large-scale ground operation. While the war with Iran is what’s driving global economic and strategic consequences, a major ground war in Lebanon could generate far greater human suffering.
7. Another major, and often underappreciated, consequence of this conflict is the long-term impact on the U.S.–Israel relationship. The fight over the JCPOA during the Obama administration created a lasting fissure within the Democratic Party that has since expanded. This might do the same in the Republican Party. Right now, you can see the beginnings of elite-level debate and division among conservative foreign policy voices and influencers, even if that hasn’t yet translated into a shift among Republican voters. History suggests that elite debate often precedes broader public realignment. A decade from now, it is entirely plausible that Republicans could be as internally divided over Israel policy as Democrats are today. That would represent a profound shift in American politics—and in the bilateral relationship.
8. Meanwhile, in the United States public support for the war is already showing signs of erosion. Initial polling was weak, in large part because the administration did little to prepare the American public for the scale and risks of the conflict. There was a brief uptick as partisan consolidation kicked in and Republicans rallied behind the president. But as the conflict drags on and the costs become clearer, those numbers are starting to decline again. We’ve already likely hit peak support for the war and that was still less than 50%.
9. So what is the most realistic path out of this? At the moment, it is not a negotiated diplomatic breakthrough. The positions are simply too far apart, and the conflict dynamics are moving in the opposite direction. The most plausible off-ramp involves the president declaring that U.S. objectives have been achieved, announcing an end to U.S. military involvement, promising to restraint Israel and making clear we will stop if Iran ceases attacks on regional neighbors and does not resume it’s nuclear program. Iran would likely continue limited attacks for a short period, but it would also face significant international pressure to de-escalate. Over time, that pressure could help bring the conflict to a close, even if the outcome falls far short of a comprehensive or satisfying resolution. This is not an ideal outcome. It does not resolve the underlying issues, and it leaves many risks unaddressed. But in the current environment, it may be the only realistic option available. Better to accept this likely outcome today rather than six months from now
https://x.com/ilangoldenberg/status/2036832750984933737