this part is just false. the moment an officer walks in front of a vehicle he needs to be planning on what he'll do if she stops, reverses, or goes forward. he's not there to just be a braindead traffic cone. he clearly wasnt thinking, because his first reaction wasnt self preservation but a panicked draw of his firearm. in the same time it took to draw, aim, and fire, he could have sidestepped even a straight traveling vehicle. he didn't, his first reaction was dead force. if she was facing straight he'd have killed himself, because her dead body would have run him down. this is common in officer cross examination, "what were you thinking leading up to x, y, and z". not just "what was in your head in this 1 second we see". he's still likely legally covered, just bad training and worse execution.
That is very precisely the argument that was rejected in Bowcutt.;
Quote
Deputy Bowcutt contends that the district court committed reversible error when it failed to grant him qualified immunity. We conclude that the district court erred in denying qualified immunity to Deputy Bowcutt. Specifically, we hold that Deputy Bowcutt's use of force was objectively reasonable and that the facts Ms. Clark has shown do not make out a violation of a constitutional right. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for entry of summary judgment in Deputy Bowcutt's favor.
...
Ms. Clark limits her claim to the argument that deadly force was unconstitutionally used when Deputy Bowcutt “deliberately stepped in front of Burkinshaw's vehicle as it was moving forward and remained in front of the vehicle despite opportunities to move aside” before shooting Mr. Burkinshaw. Aplee.'s Br. at 6. Ms. Clark also argues that the pursuit leading up to the shooting did not create an imminent threat of harm and therefore did not justify the use of deadly force. Deputy Bowcutt, on the other hand, contends that his use of deadly force was justified because he reasonably perceived that Mr. Burkinshaw's operation of the Volkswagen posed an immediate threat of death.
....
Ms. Clark also makes much of the purported recklessness of Deputy Bowcutt's conduct in stepping in front of Mr. Burkinshaw's Volkswagen. Similarly, the district court concluded that “f Bowcutt could have reasonably moved out of the way, his decision to step in front of the car and remain there when it became apparent Burkinshaw was not going to stop may be found by a jury to have been reckless and to have unnecessarily created the need to use deadly force.” Aplt.'s App. at 232. However, “[t]his is tantamount to the proposition that a citizen has a Fourth Amendment right to be free of police actions contributing to the use of deadly force by the citizen.” Wilson, 52 F.3d at 1554 (emphasis added). That proposition is unsupported by our precedent. See id. (“The ‘failure to take cover’ was presumably at issue [in our prior decision] only insofar as it bore upon whether the officer's life was truly in danger. The court never stated that it bore upon whether the officer contributed to the subject's use of deadly force.” (discussing Quezada v. City of Bernalillo, 944 F.2d 710, 717 (10th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Saucier, 533 U.S. 194)); see also Romero v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 60 F.3d 702, 704 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that in Wilson “we refused to consider whether an officer who used deadly force in self-defense had caused the suspect to behave in a threatening manner”).
Moreover, our inquiry on excessive force must focus on whether “the officer was in danger in the moment of the threat.” Wilson, 52 F.3d at 1554. And “[m]ere negligent actions precipitating a confrontation would not ․ be actionable under § 1983,” Sevier, 60 F.3d at 699 n.7; “officers' conduct is only actionable if it rises to the level of recklessness” for purposes of a § 1983 claim, Thomson, 584 F.3d at 1320 (emphasis added); accord Mason v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 806 F.3d 268, 288 (5th Cir. 2015).
Moreover you can simply replace "police officer standing in front of vehicle" with "12 year old child wandering in front of vehicle"
You do not have a right to mow down kids who walk in front of you. The officer had a lawful purpose to place himself where he did, but that's not even necessary to establish AWDW and the justification of deadly force to neutralize a driver- if she had been trying to mow down a child walking in front of the vehicle, the driver would still very obviously be at fault. As a driver you don't get to just mow down people who get in your way.
Is it punishable by death? (If we ignore “assault with a deadly weapon” situation).
They should have all been arrested with severe community service sentences.
Self-defense arguments are never about what the outcomes 'should' be