Well I don't understand why they don't secure borders better, a lot of bad things would have been avoided tbh.

It was outlined previously how the IDF were brought before the Israeli Parliament and they testified that on the morning of Oct 7th, they were ordered to stand down by their superiors and to not patrol the relevant section of the border. Strangely enough our resident Israeli's made no comment on this. Ideally addressing the facts of the day.

According to multiple recent reports, a soldier named Shalom Sheetrit (or “Shitrit”) — assigned to the elite Golani Brigade at the Gaza‑border outpost Pega outpost near Kibbutz Be'eri — gave testimony (or a statement) claiming that at 5:20 a.m. on Oct 7 his unit received an order from a battalion commander that “there are no patrols at the fence until nine in the morning.”

He described the order as “strange” and unprecedented for a unit tasked with routine border patrols.

The testimony has been widely reported in pro‑Palestinian media and commentary as potential evidence that the IDF (or parts of it) may have “stood down” just before the breach, raising questions about whether those orders facilitated the attack rather than being merely negligent.

strangely enough, the Knesset recordings of these interviews - which i watched a few months ago, are no longer available. bless. looks like a gag order.

This post was edited by ferdia on Nov 29 2025 06:36pm

It makes sense, at least probably learning from mistakes now.

I dont have any hard evidence obviously but given Israeli capabilities I assume this was permitted to happen to the extent that it happened for political reasons to support the campaign that followed. Iirc Egypt had warned them.

Plenty of suppositions can be made ofc, truth might never be known.

The claim “the IDF was ordered to stand down” is misleading.

What is actually documented is that in at least some sectors there was a local operational order not to move close to the fence that morning. That is not unusual when there is a credible anti tank missile threat. Armies routinely pull patrols back from exposed positions when intelligence warns of ATGM risk.

A named Golani soldier did say his unit was told “no patrols on the fence until 9”. He also said the reason given was fear of anti tank fire. That is tactical caution, not proof of an intentional “let it happen” order.

Serious negligence and failed judgment, yes.
Evidence of a coordinated stand down order or political conspiracy, no.

Maybe they had someone who let them know that info to act, an insider I mean, or was a lucky coincidence.

Impossible to argue against a conspiracy theory, so I won’t even try other than expressing my disbelieve in this narrative.
That being said, two things should be kept in mind:
1. Every good conspiracy theory has some truth in it
2. If we believe that narrative, then we have to believe that everyone or almost everyone are lying. From the commander that said stand down to the entire chain of command.

In case of number two, I find it hard to believe since more than a few people are required to be “in” in order to carry out this kind of operation and so, I find it unlikely.

I remain of the view that intelligence was provided and that it was discounted on the basis that Palestinians were deemed inferior creatures incapable of such an act. complacency. I am happy not to dwell on the conspiracy theory.

The intelligence had existed since 2014, but intelligence without proper context is meaningless. As someone who served in a special unit, I know that raw information alone is not enough. It must be interpreted correctly within the strategic reality of the moment.

At the time, Hamas had a clear pattern of behavior. In the previous conflict with Islamic Jihad, Hamas actively worked to calm the situation and chose not to enter the fighting. That created an operational assumption that Hamas was prioritizing stability over escalation.

Because of that, reports indicating an attack did not fit the established behavior model. The warning signs existed, but without consistent supporting actions, they did not trigger a conclusion that a large scale offensive was imminent. In hindsight, this was a critical misreading of intent rather than a total intelligence failure.