I mean, those takes are clearly hyperbole, but there is a grain or truth to it. Bear with me: Let's assume for a moment that Trump's peace plan goes through mostly as proposed and that the US security guarantees to Ukraine prove reliable over the following years - what would Russia have accomplished in the end, compared with the status quo ante in January 2022?
They would have captured the third of Donetsk/Luhansk which they were still missing back then, they would have taken a small strip of mostly depopulated and not very resource-rich land between the Donbass and Crimea, and they would have gotten Ukraine to officially acknowledge the secession of Crimea and the Donbas. Ukraine, on the other hand, would have defended its autonomy and could join the EU and now has US security guarantees which prevent Russia from pushing them around or taking more of their territory in the future. Meanwhile, Finland and Sweden have joined NATO and NATO is now much more alert to any Russian actions in general. The West is re-arming, which according to the Russian theory of the case forces Russia to keep spending bigger sums on its own military in the coming years than they would like to.
All in all, this outcome is still a "win" for Russia (rather than a loss, lmao), but it's a far smaller win than what they were going for. And it would indeed be valid to question whether such an outcome was actually worth the death toll and the economic disruption. The answer is probably a "yes", but only narrowly so.
On the other hand, if the peace plan ends up being trash, Ukraine gives up its most fortified positions in the Donbas (Kramatorsk/Sloviansk), Russia keeps attacking and the US goes back on its security guarantees, leaves Ukraine high and dry, then this plan would be a huge boon to Russia. So long story short, we're back at my previous point that the specifics and the reliabiltiy of those security guarantees will be the crux in all of this.
OK, i mulled over it a bit, here is my response:
We are looking at this from completely different viewpoints. In my view, Ukraine has been, and continues to be, used, willingly, by the West. My position is straightforward: if Russia is left alone and not provoked, it will leave others alone. Whether Crimea or Georgia, every time Russia has engaged in what the West calls “imperial conquest,” it has been in reaction to Western pressure or aggression. I am not interested in Western propaganda; I am interested in facts.
The facts are these: the 28-point plan would formalize Russian control over roughly 20% of Ukraine, including strategic and resource-rich regions. But this is not just about 20% of Ukraine - US actions over the past decade have transformed Russia from a “sleeping bear” into a highly relevant global adversary. Instead of pivoting to Asia peacefully, the US now faces the prospect of Russia, China, and India aligning in ways that reshape the global balance. Fundamentally, Russia's institutions are weak and there is little evidence to support a radical change in culture, but this conflict has opened Pandora's box as to what Russia does next. The key problem is, we have made Russia our enemy, and Russia now bears a grudge. It will be antagonistic towards the West and will be more inclined to look towards India and China. These are not small matters.
I do not care about Ukrainian security concerns, because in my view neither Ukraine nor the West will abide by any treaty and will seek to reclaim territory they are about to lose. Ukraine itself stated as far back as 2018 that it expected future wars with Russia — wars it already knew it was likely to lose. This conflict is only the beginning. Regarding EU membership: Russia has previously stated it can reluctantly accept Ukraine in the EU, just as it has accepted Finland and Sweden joining NATO. While unhappy, Russia considers it tolerable.
Finally, your logic — that the West is re-arming to start an arms race — ignores a crucial reality: the world is bigger than Europe and America. If the goal of an arms race is to exhaust a population economically, then what happens if those trying to do the bankrupting are themselves bankrupted first? After the 2008 global financial crisis, Australia was the first “Western” nation to bounce back, largely because of its economic proximity to China, which continued growing despite the global downturn. This illustrates how alignment with rising powers can buffer against Western-led shocks. In that context, it is in China’s strategic and economic interest to support Russia, as a counterweight to the West, while much of the Global South views Western interventions — in Ukraine, Israel, and elsewhere — with deep skepticism. Attempting to bankrupt Russia through an arms race, therefore, risks running down a one-way street: it assumes Western leverage is decisive, while ignoring China’s backing, Russia’s resilience, and the limits of global willingness to follow Western-led policies.
This post was edited by ferdia on Nov 25 2025 07:03am