I don't think this conclusion that Ukraine is on the verge of collapse necessarily follows from the recent push for a ceasefire. Trump turned his attention to Ukraine pretty much as soon as the Gaza ceasefire deal was done. After notching a major foreign policy success by brokering a ceasefire in Gaza, it makes perfect sense from both a rational and a psychological point of view that Trump now seeks to do the same in Ukraine. Even from a geopolitical pov, it makes sense to get rid of this distraction so that the full focus can be turned on the actual rival, China. And also from an economic pov: ending the Ukraine war would ease inflation and supply chain issues across the globe. Trump's advisors probably know full well that a souring economy is the biggest threat to his presidency.
Likewise, Russia increasing its missile and drone attacks can also be viewed as their attempt to get into as dominant a position as possible ahead of negotiations. (Although I believe that it's more a retaliation for Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries and factories.)
Agree on the bolded.
I don't really think it's about total collapse, and losing neither of these cities means Ukraine's army has collapsed. But if we are honest we can always point to key battles, typically with large scale losses that were significant in wars. Did the battle of Kursk mean Germany collapsed? Did Stalingrad? No of course not, but we can both look back and say it illustrates of how the war was shaping out. It's the big scale both sides throw all they got at it battles that usually serve as the indicators.
Fact of the matter is most large scale battles where both sides are throwing tons of resources Russia has eventually moved forward. Siverskodonetsk, Bakhmut, Toretsk, Avdiivka, Vuhledar, Mariupol.
Now you have Pokrovsk, Kupyansk trending the same way. And remember what has happened after the former fell, it usually leads to a bloom like expansion because it's usually the cities that are heavily fortified and can be turned into fortresses, and once they fall tens of km around it are basically ready for the taking.
I found this take on twitter and tbh think it is a very sober assesment of the war.
Quote
Fortresses Far Beyond Attrition
The idea that the Ukrainian tactic is to slowly cede territory at the cost of many lives, thereby winning a war of attrition, is nothing more than propaganda.
As I wrote some time ago, the numbers for Ukrainian losses of equipment like tanks, IFVs, and artillery are in the range of 75-95%, and the age range of Ukrainian soldiers in the trenches is over 45 years old. That manpower has had its weight reduced within the Ukrainian defensive tactic, but it still reveals a human shortage.
Ukraine hasn't won a significant battle on the eastern front in at least 3 years of war.
When you're defeated in a war of attrition, you don't automatically lose the war; you can choose to change tactics with the scraps of what's left of your equipment and manpower, shift to guerrilla operations, harden forced conscription even further, adjust enlistment ages, borrow more money, adopt forced entrenchment to the last man... the solutions to make it seem like you're still standing are countless, but all of them will only accentuate and prolong a defeat that's already been announced, because there is no victory without troops.
When a conflict drags on in this way, sustained by propaganda of possible victory, it will only have tactical numbers in a micro-zone to show, trying to elevate that to a level of false strategic perception, which is exactly what's happening today with the number of drones killing Russian soldiers.
Judging the invasion morally resolves absolutely nothing on the front. Right or wrong, the Russians are winning the war at a high cost, but one that can be paid without great difficulty considering the economic resources of these new regions.
There are only two things capable of changing the picture in Ukraine and easing Ukrainian losses: A peace agreement actively involving the US and trading land for other concessions, or simply other countries deciding to send troops, which is less likely.
Nothing beyond that has the strength to change the picture in Ukraine. The brutal war of attrition was already lost months ago, and today the country is dependent on a very effective design of drone warfare—but for how long?
The weekly average of Russian attacks using FAB bombs is nearly 500, for which Ukrainian defenses have no countermeasures at all, and the Russians have evolved a lot in terms of drones this year, becoming superior thanks to the massive use of fiber optic cables.
Although none of this will significantly alter the speed of the Russian advance, the question remains: What's the allies' plan besides [just] while Ukraine is being occupied?
No one disputes that Russian losses are greater, but Russia's capacity to replace its losses is much greater too. And that's the basic point of a war of attrition.
I emphasize once again that the Ukrainians know the terrain, the Russian doctrine, and are doing an excellent job of containment and delay, but what will happen when these fortresses are taken?
Of the large and highly fortified defenses, only Kramatorsk and Sloviansk remain.
It's a war with fewer casualties, but still with deaths and high desertion in the face of the panic from swarms of drones and the deafening explosions of the FABs.
The estimate is that the numbers of Ukrainian desertions and abandonments of positions are in the range of nearly 400,000, since official figures already exceed 250,000 and there are still many old cases to be processed.
One side in the conflict doesn't negotiate when it so decides. It does so when there are no means of victory and its capacity to replace losses is already minimal, foreseeing increases in territorial losses, economic and social deterioration.
Sometimes a good victory is obtained through the skill of negotiating the terms of peace, and Ukraine has heavyweights as allies in that process.