Access the force of David chalmers "zombie world" argument against metaphysical materialism.

Does his argument succeed? Explain.

Post the argument here and we will access it by reading your post

According to Chalmers, one can coherently conceive of an entire zombie world, a world physically indistinguishable from this world but entirely lacking conscious experience. The counterpart of every conscious being in our world would be a p-zombie. Since such a world is conceivable, Chalmers claims, it is logically possible, which is all the argument requires. Chalmers states: "Zombies are probably not naturally possible: they probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#Zombie_arguments

The outline structure of Chalmers' version of the zombie argument is as follows;

1. According to physicalism all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.
2. Thus, if physicalism is true, a logically-possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world.
3. In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world) and we can not see why it is not logically possible. (Argument from ignorance)
4. Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows from 2. and 3. by modus tollens.)

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Personally, I reject premise #3 on the grounds that one cannot truly conceive of an identical world without consciousness if that world is composed of the same physical matter in the same arrangement because I have reason to believe that consciousness is the product of electrical and chemical stimulation within brains, which would still exist in their same forms and promote consciousness necessarily.

Premise 3 is the one to go for, as the only reason the premise holds up to light scrutiny is because we don't fully understand how consciousness arises. If consciousness arises from physical processes, as is premise 1, then premise 3 is wrong, as we cannot conceive of a p-zombie world without their brains being physically different. It's a pretty self defeating argument in this way.

All it boils down to is 'We don't understand consciousness, therefore it must be transcendent, therefore physicalism is false.' which is pretty weak.