Quote (Speztsnaz @ Sat, 13 Dec 2008, 09:25)
Whether we acknowledge their existence are not the fact of the matter is they still exist. Because they are there.
Not to flog a dead horse, but "they" are not there, because you've got no way to refer to any "they" if nobody is around to know. The point is that things only become things because of language. There's no such thing as 'exist' until we start cognizing. It's an epistemological point: what's the sense in which a stone exists if no sentient beings exist? You can't ask questions about it. "How much does it weigh?" It has neither weight nor mass; we can't make any descriptions of it. Existence is a description of something we know. Or put it this way: say that you're an alien that doesn't have concepts of 'table' and 'chair', or many other things we know about. You walk into a room full of things, and you're asked via translation what the objects are in front of you are. You will see a 'table-chair', among other things, but because of the way you cut up the world, but you're not necesasarily going to see the table or the chair as discrete objects. The point isn't that the chair and table don't exist, because this is really only a point about knowing and naming, but the idea is that object formation has everything to do with us, just as truth does. So without us, we have no objects, no things, and no truth, because there's no world that's neatly cut up. Even saying we'd have "things" is an act of naming or thing-ing. Whatever mass/lump/stuff there would be without us, our attempts at naming and making sense of "it" utterly fail.
'Zero' is an interesting case. There's a discussion of non-being that's popular in undergraduate philosophy classes. That is to say, that discussion is about things like unicorns that don't exist. But we can refer to them, so what's the deal. The simple answer is that there is no special class of non-beings (like the one you'd need to make the point against the argument I suggest above), but rather when we refer to a unicorn, we're refering to states of imagination. With the concept of zero, we actually have a referent, and the referent is easy to pick out. We're refering to an imaginary figure, but we're taking a special step in the case of zero, because it's not just any object of our imagination, but one imbued with mathematical and even spatial meaning. Nonetheless, I can't pick up zero eggs and give them to you unless we're playing a game of the imagination, because otherwise what I'm not carrying is non-specific: I'm not carrying 500 elastics, I'm not holding three erasers, etc. too. That's an aweful lot to not carry