Quote (ThatAlex @ 12 Jan 2020 18:34)

I don't understand the point of scrapping the deal when we already paid the upfront cost. The Iran Deal at least slowed down their path to a nuke. Now we have nothing. My suspicion is that Trump got rid of the deal for political purposes (Obama did it), not because his administration actually thought they could come up with a better deal. Hence, no new deal.
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Quote (bogie160 @ 12 Jan 2020 18:18)

The UN Security council implicitly acknowledges that all countries are not created equal. Countries that are pillars of international order get a much larger say.

Iran doesn't get to set the rules of engagement. If they want to prioritize the export of revolution abroad, they have a right to do that, just as the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states have a right to respond.

Let go of the idea that the world is "fair", it makes you sound like a 6 year old child.

Quote (Black XistenZ @ 12 Jan 2020 18:42)

I agree on the second part, but not on the part with the upfront cost. The key concession of the Iran deal were the lifted sanctions which greatly increased Iran's financial breathing room. After Iran had proven that their intention was to use this financial breathing room to stoke conflicts in its neighborhood, this concession was no longer sustainable. But the Obama administration obviously couldnt rescind its own deal without completely losing its face, so that had to wait until his successor was sworn in.

But yeah, I dont believe that Trump engaged in a deep analysis of the situation. Him revoking the Iran deal out of spite (big symbolic victory for Obama, even though it was actually a shitty deal) seems more plausible tbh...

Quote (fender @ Jan 12 2020 12:44pm)

i don't know where you picked up that stupid phrase, but it's not only idiotic trying to justify hypocrisy like that, it's also irrelevant to this discussion.

also, my posts are not based on the assumption that the world is 'fair', they are pointing out that right wing americans (and some european trump cucks) are applying massive double standards while trying to portray iran as 'evil' as opposed to a 'good' (or 'pillar of international order' - i have to admit, that really was a good one in this context) america - when in fact we have two shitty empires colliding, of which america is clearly the aggressor, not only in the larger historical context, but also concerning recent developments.

Quote (fender @ 12 Jan 2020 18:51)

{citation needed}

just repeating that claim doesn't make it true, you know? doubling down on neocon propaganda won't hide the fact that even trumps own advisors opposed his withdrawal from the deal - no matter how often you dodge those facts...

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In 2017, Reuters interviewed an unnamed Iranian official who said that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had held a meeting on ways to “empower” the Houthis. “At this meeting, they agreed to increase the amount of help, through training, arms and financial support,” the official said.

Iran has issued official denials of accusations that it is arming the Houthis, but intercepted weapons shipments in the Arabian Sea have yielded rifles, rocket launchers, antitank guided missiles and munitions that appear to have been en route from Iran to Yemen for the insurgency.

Quote (tagged4nothing @ 12 Jan 2020 18:52)

in short, it doesn't matter how many times or how drastically they break the nuclear deal. we should just keep giving them money.
if we don't we are aggressors. awesome

Quote (Black XistenZ @ 12 Jan 2020 19:09)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_involvement_in_the_Syrian_Civil_War

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/09/16/why-iran-is-getting-blame-an-attack-saudi-arabia-claimed-by-yemens-houthis/



Furthermore, it is well-known that the Hezbollah in Lebanon has extremely tight ties to Iran. The current Iraqi government is heavily influenced by Teheran as well. The recent protests in Iraq were directed, among other things, against this Iranian influence. It were Shiite militias with strong ties to Iran which quelled the protests by force, with hundreds of casualties. To add even more, one of those militias is directly responsible for the march on the U.S. embassy in Bagdad from 2 weeks ago. The leader of this militia then was literally a part of Soleimani's entourage at the airport where the American drone strike killed all of them.

Quote (fender @ Jan 12 2020 01:26pm)

i don't know how good your english reading comprehension is, but nowhere does it say or even suggest that iran used "all the freed up resources from the lifted sanctions to fuel its proxy wars in the region instead of building up its country". again, you're creating a causal link between the two events in order to delegitimise the deal, when realistically there is at best a weak connection between the two - and it's iran's choice what to do with their funds regardless. do i approve of their foreign policy? no. but do i understand their motivation, especially in the context of american activities (like arming their arch rivals to the teeth and supporting their genocide in yemen) in the region? absolutely.

the deal was to prevent them from developing nukes. it did that. adding additional, not agreed upon requirements now, just to distract from the fact that there was no rational or justifiable reason to just withdraw from it, is not just dishonest, it's outright stupid.

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Summary of provisions
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) runs to 109 pages, including five annexes.[51] Major provisions of the final accord include the following:[51][65][66]

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Nuclear
Iran's stockpile of low-enriched uranium was reduced by 97 percent, from 10,000 kg to 300 kg.[69] This reduction will be maintained for fifteen years.[51][70][71][72] For the same fifteen-year period, Iran will be limited to enriching uranium to 3.67%, a percentage sufficient for civilian nuclear power and research, but not for building a nuclear weapon.[70][71][73] However, the number of centrifuges is sufficient for a nuclear weapon, but not for nuclear power.[74] This is a "major decline" in Iran's previous nuclear activity; prior to watering down its stockpile pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action interim agreement, Iran had enriched uranium to near 20% (medium-enriched uranium).[70][71][72] These enriched uranium in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% will be down blended to natural uranium level or be sold in return for natural uranium, and the uranium enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or sold or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67%. The implementation of the commercial contracts will be facilitated by P5+1. After fifteen years, all physical limits on enrichment will be removed, including limits on the type and number of centrifuges, Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium, and where Iran may have enrichment facilities. According to Belfer, at this point Iran could "expand its nuclear program to create more practical overt and covert nuclear weapons options".[68][75]
For ten years, Iran will place over two-thirds of its centrifuges in storage, from its current stockpile of 19,000 centrifuges (of which 10,000 were operational) to no more than 6,104 operational centrifuges, with only 5,060 allowed to enrich uranium,[51][70] with the enrichment capacity being limited to the Natanz plant. The centrifuges there must be IR-1 centrifuges, the first-generation centrifuge type which is Iran's oldest and least efficient; Iran will give up its advanced IR-2M centrifuges in this period.[49][71][72] The non-operating centrifuges will be stored in Natanz and monitored by IAEA, but may be used to replace failed centrifuges.[76][77] Iran will not build any new uranium-enrichment facilities for fifteen years.[70]
Iran may continue research and development work on enrichment, but that work will take place only at the Natanz facility and include certain limitations for the first eight years.[49] This is intended to keep the country to a breakout time of one year.[70]
With cooperation from the "Working Group" (the P5+1 and possibly other countries), Iran is to modernise and rebuild the Arak heavy water research reactor based on an agreed design to support its peaceful nuclear research and production needs and purposes, but in such a way to minimise the production of plutonium and not to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The power of the redesigned reactor will not exceed 20 MWth. The P5+1 parties will support and facilitate the timely and safe construction of the Arak complex.[78] All spent fuel will be sent out of the country.[49] All excess heavy water which is beyond Iran's needs for the redesigned reactor will be made available for export to the international market based on international prices. In exchange, Iran received 130 tons of uranium in 2015 and in late 2016 was approved to receive 130 tons in 2017.[79] For 15 years Iran will not engage in, or research, spent fuel reprocessing.[80] Iran will also not build any additional heavy-water reactors or accumulate heavy water for 15 years.[49]
Iran's Fordow facility will stop enriching uranium and researching uranium enrichment for at least fifteen years; the facility will be converted into a nuclear physics and technology center. For 15 years Fordow will maintain no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades in one wing of Fordow. "Two of those six cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through appropriate infrastructure modification," for stable radioisotope production for medical, agricultural, industrial, and scientific use. "The other four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle." Iran will not be permitted to have any fissile material in Fordow.[49][70][72]
Iran is implementing an Additional Protocol that will continue in perpetuity for as long as Iran remains a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The signing of the Additional Protocol represents a continuation of the monitoring and verification provisions "long after the comprehensive agreement between the P5+1 and Iran is implemented".[81]
A comprehensive inspections regime will be implemented in order to monitor and confirm that Iran is complying with its obligations and is not diverting any fissile material.[70][71][c]
The IAEA will have multilayered[92] oversight "over Iran's entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium mills to its procurement of nuclear-related technologies".[93] For declared nuclear sites such as Fordow and Natanz, the IAEA will have "round-the-clock access" to nuclear facilities and will be entitled to maintain continuous monitoring (including via surveillance equipment) at such sites.[93][94] The agreement authorizes the IAEA to make use of sophisticated monitoring technology, such as fiber-optic seals on equipment that can electronically send information to the IAEA; infrared satellite imagery to detect covert sites, "environmental sensors that can detect minute signs of nuclear particles"; tamper-resistant, radiation-resistant cameras.[61][95] Other tools include computerized accounting programs to gather information and detect anomalies, and big data sets on Iranian imports, to monitor dual-use items.[92]
The number of IAEA inspectors assigned to Iran will triple, from 50 to 150 inspectors.[61]
If IAEA inspectors have concerns that Iran is developing nuclear capabilities at any non-declared sites, they may request access "to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with" the agreement, informing Iran of the basis for their concerns.[94] The inspectors would only come from countries with which Iran has diplomatic relations.[96] Iran may admit the inspectors to such site or propose alternatives to inspection that might satisfy the IAEA's concerns.[94] If such an agreement cannot be reached, a process running to a maximum of 24 days is triggered.[94] Under this process, Iran and the IAEA have 14 days to resolve disagreements among themselves.[94] If they fail to, the Joint Commission (including all eight parties) would have one week in which to consider the intelligence which initiated the IAEA request. A majority of the Commission (at least five of the eight members) could then inform Iran of the action that it would be required to take within three more days.[97][98] The majority rule provision "means the United States and its European allies—Britain, France, Germany and the EU—could insist on access or any other steps and that Iran, Russia or China could not veto them".[97] If Iran did not comply with the decision within three days, sanctions would be automatically reimposed under the snapback provision (see below).[98]
As a result of the above, the "breakout time"—the time in which it would be possible for Iran to make enough material for a single nuclear weapon—will increase from two to three months to one year, according to U.S. officials and U.S. intelligence.[51][70][99][d] An August 2015 report published by a group of experts at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs concurs in these estimates, writing that under the JCPOA, "over the next decade would be extended to roughly a year, from the current estimated breakout time of 2 to 3 months".[68] The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation also accepts these estimates.[101][102] By contrast, Alan J. Kuperman, coordinator of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at the University of Texas at Austin, disputed the one-year assessment, arguing that under the agreement, Iran's breakout time "would be only about three months, not much longer than it is today".[103]
The longer breakout time would be in place for at least ten years; after that point, the breakout time would gradually decrease.[51][99] By the 15th year, U.S. officials say the breakout time would return to the pre-JCPOA status quo of a few months.[51][99] The Belfer Center report states: "Some contributors to this report believe that breakout time by year 15 could be comparable to what it is today—a few months—while others believe it could be reduced to a few weeks."[68]

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Exemptions
Reuters reported that exemptions were granted to Iran prior to 16 January 2016. The reported purpose of the exemptions was so that sanctions relief and other benefits could start by that date, instead of Iran being in violation. The exemptions included: (a) Iran able to exceed the 300 Kg of 3.5% LEU limit in the agreement; (b) Iran able to exceed the zero Kg of 20% LEU limit in the agreement; (c) Iran to keep operating 19 "hot cells" that exceed the size limit in the agreement; (d) Iran to maintain control of 50 tonnes of heavy water that exceed the 130 tonne limit in the agreement by storing the excess at an Iran-controlled facility in Oman.[104] In December 2016, the IAEA published decisions of the Joint Commission that spell out these clarifications of the JCPOA.[105]

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Sanctions
Further information: Sanctions against Iran
The following provisions regarding sanctions are written into the JCPOA:

Following the issuance of a IAEA report verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures, the UN sanctions against Iran and some EU sanctions will terminate and some will be suspended. Once sanctions are lifted, Iran will recover approximately $100 billion of its assets (U.S. Treasury Department estimate) frozen in overseas banks.[106]
Eight years into the agreement, EU sanctions against a number of Iranian companies, individuals and institutions (such as the Revolutionary Guards) will be lifted.[107]
The United States will "cease" application of its nuclear-related secondary sanctions[108] by presidential action or executive waiver.[109] Secondary sanctions are those that sanction other countries for doing business with Iran. Primary U.S. sanctions, which prohibit U.S. firms from conducting commercial transactions with few exceptions, are not altered by the JCPOA.[110]
This step is not tied to any specific date, but is expected to occur "roughly in the first half of 2016".[108][111][112]
Sanctions relating to ballistic missile technologies would remain for eight years; similar sanctions on conventional weapon sales to Iran would remain for five years.[51][113]
However, all U.S. sanctions against Iran related to alleged human rights abuses, missiles, and support for terrorism are not affected by the agreement and will remain in place.[72][114] U.S. sanctions are viewed as more stringent, since many have extraterritorial effect (i.e., they apply worldwide). EU sanctions, by contrast, apply only in Europe.[107]
No new UN or EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures will be imposed.[115]
If Iran violates the agreement, any of the P5+1 can invoke a "snap back" provision, under which the sanctions "snap back" into place (i.e., are reimplemented).[70][71][115]
Specifically, the JCPOA establishes the following dispute resolution process: if a party to the JCPOA has reason to believe that another party is not upholding its commitments under the agreement, then the complaining party may refer its complaint to the Joint Commission, a body created under the JCPOA to monitor implementation.[72][116] If a complaint made by a non-Iran party is not resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining party within thirty-five days of referral, then that party could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA, notify the United Nations Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance, or both.[116] The Security Council would then have thirty days to adopt a resolution to continue the lifting of sanctions. If such a resolution is not adopted within those thirty days, then the sanctions of all of the pre-JCPOA nuclear-related UN Security Council resolutions would automatically be re-imposed. Iran has stated that in such a case, it would cease performing its nuclear obligations under the deal.[60][116] The effect of this rule is that any permanent member of the Security Council (United States, United Kingdom, China, Russia and France) can veto any ongoing sanctions relief, but no member can veto the re-imposition of sanctions.
Snapback sanctions "would not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions".[76]
Ankit Panda of The Diplomat states that this will make impossible any scenario where Iran is non-compliant with the JCPOA yet escapes re-imposition of sanctions.[116] But Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (which opposes the agreement) argues that because the JCPOA provides that Iran could treat reinstatement of sanctions (in part or entirely) as grounds for leaving the agreement, the United States would be reluctant to impose a "snapback" for smaller violations: "The only thing you'll take to the Security Council are massive Iranian violations, because you're certainly not going to risk the Iranians walking away from the deal and engaging in nuclear escalation over smaller violations."[117]

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Formal negotiations toward JCPOA began with the adoption of the Joint Plan of Action, an interim agreement signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in November 2013.

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Agreement provisions
The interim Geneva Accord was signed between P5+1 countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 24 November 2013.[2] The deal consists of the short-term freezing of key parts of the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for a decrease in sanctions, as both sides work towards a long-term agreement.

The agreement makes the following stipulations on the Iranian nuclear program:[25][26][27][28]

All uranium enriched beyond 5% will either be diluted or converted to uranium oxide. No new uranium at the 3.5% enrichment level will be added to Iran's current stock.
No new centrifuges will be installed or prepared for installation.
50% of the centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment facility and 75% at the Fordow enrichment facility will be left inoperable. Iran will not use its advanced IR-2 centrifuges for enrichment.
Iran will not develop any new uranium enrichment or nuclear reprocessing facilities.
No fuel will be produced, tested, or transferred to the Arak nuclear power plant. In addition, Iran will share design details of the reactor.
The IAEA will be granted daily access to Natanz and Fordow, with certain sites monitored by 24-hour cameras. The IAEA will also have access to Iran's uranium mines and centrifuge production facilities.
Iran will address IAEA questions related to possible military dimensions of the nuclear program and provide data expected as part of an Additional Protocol.
In exchange, Iran will receive relief from sanctions of approximately US$7 billion (£4.3 billion) and no additional sanctions will be imposed.[29][30] The agreement sets a six-month time frame for a more comprehensive follow-up agreement between Iran and the P5+1 negotiators to formalize Iran's nuclear relationship with the world.[31]

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In addition, sanctions on Iran's auto industry, as well as sanctions on associated services will be suspended. License for the supply and installation in Iran of spare parts for safety of flight for Iranian civil aviation and associated services will be permitted.

According to nonproliferation expert David Albright, the blending down of Iran's 20% enriched uranium will lengthen the time required for a nuclear "breakout" from 1–1.6 months to 1.9–2.2 months.[32]

The terms do not bar Iran from manufacturing components for their nuclear facilities off-site, as long as none of those components are installed. One western diplomat said the impact of this "loophole" would be very minor and could serve as a test of Iranian intentions.[33] The minister Mohammad Javad Zarif announced that Iran has no intentions to increase the capacity of the Arak site, "but construction will continue there".[34]

Quote (fender @ Jan 12 2020 12:44pm)

i don't know where you picked up that stupid phrase, but it's not only idiotic trying to justify hypocrisy like that, it's also irrelevant to this discussion.

also, my posts are not based on the assumption that the world is 'fair', they are pointing out that right wing americans (and some european trump cucks) are applying massive double standards while trying to portray iran as 'evil' as opposed to a 'good' (or 'pillar of international order' - i have to admit, that really was a good one in this context) america - when in fact we have two shitty empires colliding, of which america is clearly the aggressor, not only in the larger historical context, but also concerning recent developments.