Here is the dissent.
Quote
I would grant the Church’s requested temporary injunction because California’s latest safety guidelines discriminate against places of worship and in favor of comparable secular businesses.
Such discrimination violates the First Amendment.
In response to the COVID–19 health crisis, California has now limited attendance at religious worship services to 25% of building capacity or 100 attendees, whichever is lower.
The basic constitutional problem is that comparable secular businesses are not subject to a 25% occupancy cap, including factories, offices, supermarkets, restaurants, retail stores, pharmacies, shopping malls, pet grooming shops,bookstores, florists, hair salons, and cannabis dispensaries.
South Bay United Pentecostal Church has applied for temporary injunctive relief from California’s 25% occupancy cap on religious worship services.
Importantly, the Church is willing to abide by the State’s rules that apply to comparable secular businesses, including the rules regarding social distancing and hygiene.
But the Church objects to a 25% occupancy cap that is imposed on religious worship services but not imposed on those comparable secular businesses.
In my view, California’s discrimination against religious worship services contravenes the Constitution.
As a general matter, the “government may not use religion as a basis of classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or benefits.”
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
This Court has stated that discrimination against religion is “odious to our Constitution.” Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 15); see
also, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993); McDaniel, 435 U. S. 618.
To justify its discriminatory treatment of religious worship services, California must show that its rules are “justified by a compelling governmental interest” and “narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”
Lukumi, 508 U. S.,at 531–532.
California undoubtedly has a compelling interest in combating the spread of COVID–19 and protecting the health of its citizens. But “restrictions inexplicably applied to one group and exempted from another do little to further these goals and do much to burden religious freedom.” Roberts v. Neace, 958 F. 3d 409, 414 (CA6 2020) (per curiam).
What California needs is a compelling justification for distinguishing between (i) religious worship services and (ii) the litany of other secular businesses that are
not subject to an occupancy cap.
California has not shown such a justification. The Church has agreed to abide by the State’s rules that apply to comparable secular businesses. That raises important questions: “Assuming all of the same precautions are taken, why can someone safely walk down a grocery store aisle but not a pew? And why can someone safely interact with a brave delivery woman but not with a stoic minister?” Ibid. Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 3
The Church and its congregants simply want to be treated equally to comparable secular businesses. California already trusts its residents and any number of businesses to adhere to proper social distancing and hygiene practices. The State cannot “assume the worst when people go to worship but assume the best when people go to work or go about the rest of their daily lives in permitted social settings.” Ibid.
California has ample options that would allow it to combat the spread of COVID–19 without discriminating against religion. The State could “insist that the congregants adhere to social-distancing and other health requirements and leave it at that—just as the Governor has done for comparable secular activities.” Id., at 415. Or alternatively, the State could impose reasonable occupancy caps across the board. But absent a compelling justification (which the State has not offered), the State may not take a looser approach with, say, supermarkets, restaurants, factories, and offices while imposing stricter requirements on
places of worship.
The State also has substantial room to draw lines, especially in an emergency. But as relevant here, the Constitution imposes one key restriction on that line-drawing: The State may not discriminate against religion.
In sum, California’s 25% occupancy cap on religious worship services indisputably discriminates against religion, and such discrimination violates the First Amendment.
See Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U. S. 1312 (1986) (Scalia, J., in chambers). T
The Church would suffer irreparable harm from not being able to hold services on Pentecost Sunday in a way that comparable secular businesses and persons can conduct their activities.
I would therefore grant the Church’s request for a temporary injunction. I respectfully dissent.
Imagine thinking that merits "scolding" by the crappiest supreme court justice because a slate article told you so.