see that's the problem with jingoists: i already told you that
i understand the realpolitik behind it, but that i reject the transparent attempts to somehow downplay or justify the exploitation of iranian resources by foreign powers.
the idiotic suggestion that in order to criticise the coup d'etat, i'd have to map out a concrete plan for iran's political future in 1953, while also accepting your premise that the US would have to have been content with it, is simply absurd - especially when we have the benefit of hindsight, and know what happened in the middle east in the following decades, with the US arming factions, fighting proxy wars, invading countries, and toppling regimes, playing a huge role in plunging the whole region into chaos, for largely the same (although of course not the sole) reason. it perfectly illustrates what hoops you're willing to jump through in order to rationalise imperialist narratives.
none of that is necessary to realise that
the mossadegh administration was overthrown by western (UK & US) forces, because he had the audacity to nationalise iran's oil industry. that's neither a secret nor contested, it's simply a historical fact. no amount of revisionist deflection, and pointing to domestic opposition (at least in part paid for by the US, a fact you conveniently keep ignoring, while harping on about how he struggled politically:
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/ ) will magically change that. would he have had a bright and long political future otherwise? questionable, speculative, and most importantly: irrelevant - because his administration was overthrown by western powers, and he was replaced by a puppet in order to grant those powers access to iranian oil.
maybe you simply forgot, or didn't quite understand how we arrived here in the first place: i was replying to someone who suggested that overthrowing a foreign installed government, which is exploiting a country's natural resources, would inevitably lead to religious fundamentalists setting up a terror regime, and therefore the iranian people were simply too shortsighted and idealistic in opposing their western exploiters, and ultimately to blame for their misery. in reality, those were far from the only two thinkable options, as their democratically elected former prime minister, mohammad mossadegh, had shown previously. just because it turned out this way doesn't magically absolve the west from the injustice of stealing iranian's resources and overthrowing their democratically elected leader - just as the western coup itself does not absolve iranian fundamentalists from their guilt in brutally oppressing their own people.
let me make this a bit easier to understand for someone obviously afflicted by western arrogance and a fundamentally colonial mindset: if the US government were to be replaced by chinese puppets, and the country exploited for its resources, i am sure you'd make a temporary uncomfortable alliance with a group you generally disagree with, if it meant getting rid of those forces, wouldn't you?
it's really not such a difficult concept, so it's a bit of a shame that you seem to be "too stupid" (i apologise if that comes across as harsh) to understand it: just because history has turned out a certain way does not mean it was basically inevitable or perfectly predictable. those who commit injustices can not be absolved by retroactively pretending they surely were the lesser evil (who knows how the pahlavi dynasty would have continued? they weren't exactly squeamish in '79), based on speculation and the dumb jingoist inclination to justify whatever one's own country did in the past.
You understand realpolitik as a concept to be dismissed out of hand. We are not discussing whether or not the British were morally right, or morally wrong to sign/dictate unequal treaties with the Iranians, or any other nation. We're discussing whether the United States was correct in its analysis of the situation circa 1953. Mossadegh was (legally) a dictator. His erstwhile allies, including religious conservatives, had broken with him, and were not going to authorize his continued grip on power. The Soviet Union had influence in Iran via leftist, socialist parties, and there was an ever-present risk that Mossadegh would either be forced to rely on them, and thereby fall under the influence of the Soviets, or be overthrown, the end result that a Soviet-style party, with USSR support, would seize power. In any case, Mossadegh himself was not long for the world. The royalists were his enemies, the religious conservatives in rural Iran had turned against him, the business classes follow growth, and Mossadegh refused to compromise with the British. The United States was not party to any of that. But it was concerned that his imminent demise would give the Soviets control of Persia, and that was (justly) unacceptable. I'm not asking you to map an entire alternative future, I'm asking you to conclude whether the United States was correct in its assessment. Anyone who claims that real world considerations cannot or should not factor into country policy is a child.
The second point, which stands, is that you are significantly underselling the impact which Iranian domestic politics had on the situation. They were the primary drivers. The British oil embargo was second. US involvement came at the tail-end and reacted to the situation as it was on the ground. It was primarily a power struggle within Iranian society. The agency is there foremost. It's so less rewarding, and less accurate, to peddle drivel that simplifies complex and interesting situations into "imperialist" and "anti-imperialist" dichotomies.