Quote (Handcuffs @ Aug 6 2024 03:37am)
I worded my question poorly in my prior post, so I can see why people might have this response. Let me reframe: Where is the 'mistake' that 10/7 is in with regards to the the chain of analysis from Israel's perspective? Is it in not having the intelligence info, or in responding/making decisions about that intelligence info?
The Israeli media is talking about the “conception” from day one.
It’s a lot to explain and of course people can debate on each element but the main objectives that we (Israelis) can agree on:
1. Looking back you can always find the signs for the attack and think “how could we miss that?” There were watchers alerted about hamas training. They were silent. The chief of intelligence said it on camera, Hamas is deterred and will not act in the next five years.
2. Hamas was smart using small steps of exploiting the Israeli side desire to be left alone. In the last 10 years , about 30K of Gazans workers were allowed to work in Israel. Israel saw that as a sign of advancement towards something while those individuals provided hamas with intelligence.
3. The intelligence failure and conception about Gaza goes deeper than 10/7 events. When the first American generals came to Israel after 10/7 they were shocked to discover that Israel didn’t even prepared plans of attacking Gaza (prior to 7/10) what kind of country that lives next to an enemy doesn’t have plans of invading ? The attack on Gaza should have been started several days after the attack but instead it took place only at 10/27 because they had to prepare the attack and train the forces..
4. Our chiefs of staff , started at 2002, believed that the age of great wars is over and Israel should maintain a small but sophisticated army. So they started to cut down the funding, cancelling units. The Israeli army became smaller.
That’s the tip of the iceberg..