Quote (Voyaging @ Aug 5 2015 08:13pm)
If something like panpsychism or Strawsonian physicalism (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism#Strawsonian_physicalism ) is correct, where there is some sort of microexperiental state of particles or fields or whatever, then any pure experience could be called a "self" at the smallest/most fundamental possible level, I think.
But honestly nobody knows at this point.
i've read Strawson's works as far as you've linked them to me. panpsychism really seems like an obvious solution to me when weighing how qualia fits into the world.
however, when it comes to the basic nature of experience i'd like to pull in the phenomenological idea of intentionality, that consciousness is always a consciousness
of something to the consciousness itself - there is always
something that is experienced - regardless of whether it's consciousness itself or something external to it. so for the self to be at the most basic level, there has to be something for it to experience - even itself. a what-it's-likeness must always have its' it. this would mean (akin to Sartre's views about an "opaque self" or "the transcendence of the ego" and Stirner's "Creative nothing") that the self is an object to the self. so even at the most fundamental level this self would simply serve as a localisation for pure experience rather than a "self", as something that is totally unitary, as for the self to be a distinct being it'd have to reflect upon itself.
this self would become a self only when pure experience is localised and constricted by something to be unitary - and the intentionality of consciousness means that it can not be truly unitary to itself. so pure experience would be even more fundamental than the self that it creates - or that the the self is possibly an illusion (or a necessary illusion) created by pure experience.
i'm drunk as fuck so i might be talking out of my arse for a change, lmk if i'm not making any sense at all.
This post was edited by Gastly on Aug 5 2015 03:33pm